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1 Introduction
A central assumption in labor market search models is that a centralized market does
not exist (e.g. Pissarides, 2000). In a centralized market without search frictions it is
easy to meet partners, but there is a lot of competition by agents on the same side of the
market. Job fairs, academic job markets, and markets governed by employment agencies
share features of a centralized market. In a decentralized market job seekers typically
can visit one rm at the time. Due to uncoordinated search some employers receive
many applicants while some of them receive none. Agents on both sides of the market
enjoy some monopoly power because ones partner cannot switch to another partner
immediately. Markets where rms place job ads, and workers send applications and
travel to interviews, have many features of a decentralized market.
In this paper I ask the following question: Suppose that a centralized market place
without search frictions exists, and vacancies and job seekers can choose either it or
a decentralized search market. Which market do they choose in equilibrium? I use a
discrete-time innite horizon model where there is a xed number of homogenous workers.
The rms are also homogenous, and their number is determined by free entry and exit.
The search market is modeled as an urn-ball process where rms represent urns and
workers represent balls, and wages are determined either by Nash bargaining solution or
by public posting. In the centralized market all agents on the short side are assumed
to be matched, while the agents on the long side are rationed so that each agent has
an equal probability of being matched. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining or by
public posting.
The central results are (i) If wages are determined by bargaining in both markets, a
centralized market equilibrium exists if a rms share of match surplus is large enough
compared to a rms capital cost. There is also a mixed market equilibrium where a
centralized market and a search market coexist. This happens only for a specic value of
Nash bargaining parameter, given rmscapital cost. A decentralized market equilibrium
does not exist. At very low values of rms surplus share there is no equilibrium with
rms in the economy. (ii) If wages are determined by bargaining in the centralized
market but by public posting in the search market, a decentralized market equilibrium
exists if a rms surplus share in the centralized market is either relatively large or small
compared to capital cost. For intermediate values of a rms surplus share a centralized
market equilibrium exists. A mixed market equilibrium exists if a rms surplus share
and its capital cost satisfy a specic relation. (iii) If wages are posted in both markets, a
decentralized market equilibrium does not exist. A centralized market equilibrium exists,
as well as two continua of mixed market equilibrium.
It is known that a search model where wages are determined by Nash bargaining
results in a hold-up problem, in addition to coordination problem. As some of the
match surplus goes to workers, a xed bargaining parameter does not give rms a correct
incentive to enter the economy, and as a result there are too few rms. But if rms post
wages, the hold-up problem disappears. In a centralized market there may be too few
or too many rms, depending on the relative magnitude of rmsbargaining power and
their capital cost. This makes the Pareto ranking of centralized and decentralized market
equilibrium somewhat complicated.
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The topic relates closely to clustered markets where, within a cluster, buyers can
inspect sellers at a very small cost, and sellers design pricing strategies while facing com-
petition by other sellers. Outside the cluster buyers have higher search costs, and sellers
have some degree of monopoly power. The focus is on how search costs and heterogeneity
a¤ect buyersand sellerschoice between the markets. In Fisher and Harrington (1996)
there is an endogenous number of sellers who each produce an indivisible piece of goods.
They choose either the cluster or periphery, that is, a search market. Sellers set prices in
both markets. Then buyers choose an initial location. The cost of entering the cluster is
a draw from a probability distribution. Once in the cluster a buyer can sample all sellers
at no cost. In periphery buyers sample one rm per period at the same cost per visit.
When meeting a seller the type of goods (which is also the buyers willingness to pay) is
drawn from a uniform distribution. Buyers search with recall in both markets, and they
can switch between the markets. The cluster survives only if goods are heterogeneous
enough. In Neeman and Vulkan (2010) goods are homogenous, but production costs
and buyerswillingness to pay are stochastic. Agents cannot switch to another market
within a period. In the cluster a Walrasian market-clearing price prevails while agents
engage in direct negotiations in the search market. In equilibrium only the cluster exists.
Kulttis model (2011) has a xed number of homogenous sellers and a stochastic number
of homogenous buyers. Buyers and sellers choose either a search market or a cluster.
Sellers post prices publicly before the number of buyers is realized. It is assumed that
in the cluster all agents on the short side are matched. If sellers can choose the market
and price, only the cluster survives. Wolinsky (1983) assumes di¤erentiated goods and
monopolistic competition. Consumers are imperfectly informed about the characteristics
of the goods, and they use a stopping rule. The equilibrium features only a cluster. Miao
(2006) considers a model where heterogenous buyers and homogenous sellers choose be-
tween a centralized market where market makers publicly post bid and ask prices, and
a decentralized market where the terms of trade are determined by Nash bargaining.
Opening a centralized market does not necessarily improve social welfare since trading
in there is assumed to have a cost, and it makes the decentralized market tighter which
makes buyers there worse o¤.
To my knowledge, only one model (Fisher and Harrington, 1996) results in coexis-
tence of a centralized and a decentralized market. This happens only if the goods are
heterogeneous enough and if buyersknowledge on goodscharacteristics and prices is
imperfect. In other models, only a cluster exists. There is obviously a need for a model
which can explain the co-existence of a centralized and a decentralized market even if the
goods (or jobs) are homogenous and/or if buyers (or workers) have perfect information
about prices (wages).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some basic ingredients
of the models. Section 3 considers a model where wages are determined by bargaining in
both markets, and in Section 4 I analyze a model where wages are determined by posting
in the search market. In Section 5 I consider a model where wages are posted in both
markets. Section 6 considers a static model where the unemployment-vacancy ratio is
xed. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Agents and Timing
Time is discrete and extends to innity. Each agent discounts future at a common factor
 2 [0; 1] per period. There number of workers is L; and we assume that L is large. The
number of rms is endogenous and determined by entry and exit. Staying in the economy
costs k 2 (0; 1) for a rm each period whether it is producing or not. Labor is indivisible,
and each worker supplies one unit of labor each period, and each rm wishes to employ
one worker per period. Each matched rm-worker pair produces a unit output per period.
Each pair breaks down with probability b 2 [0; 1] after a production stage. The separated
agents start searching for a new partner, and the others continue producing.
There are two markets where rms and workers can match. The decentralized mar-
ket is a directed search market (SM) of an urn-ball type where vacancies represent the
urns and unemployed represent the balls. Wages are determined by public posting or
by Nash bargaining. This market has search friction: some agents on both sides remain
unmatched. The centralized market (CM) is like a market place or a monopolistic in-
termediary market which is assumed to have no search friction: all agents of the smaller
population are matched. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining or public posting.
Agents choose which market they enter.
In an SM equilibrium all agents are in the search market, and in a CM equilibrium all
agents are in the centralized market. In a mixed market equilibrium (MM equilibrium)
there are rms and workers in both markets. The CM equilibrium and SM equilibrium
are checked against a one-period coalitional deviation to the other market. A market
is an equilibrium if there is no coalition where all its members fare at least as well by
choosing another market.
Each period consists of a production stage and a matching stage. In the beginning of
a matching stage there are u unemployed workers and v vacant rms. Denote u=v  .
The timing of moves in a matching stage is as follows: 1) Firms choose whether to enter,
exit or stay in the economy. Firms which do not exit pay capital cost k 2 (0; 1) : 2)
Fraction  2 [0; 1] of rms locates itself in SM, and fraction 1    locates itself in CM.
Simultaneously, fraction ! 2 [0; 1] of workers go to SM, and fraction 1  ! go to CM. 3)
If rms in SM post wages, they do it, knowing the values of u, v,  and !:The wages are
observed by all agents. 4) In SM, workers choose rms on the basis of observed wages, or
at random if bargaining is used. In either case if a rm receives more than one applicant,
it hires one at random. At the same, matching takes place in CM such that all agents on
the short side form a pair with a random agent on the long side, and agents on the long
side are rationed such that each agent has the same probability of being matched. 5) In
CM, and in SM if bargaining is applied, a rm receives share  2 (0; 1) of the match
surplus. 8) All matched pairs start producing, and the unmatched agents wait for the
next matching stage.
3 Bargaining in Both Markets
This section considers a model where wages are determined by bargaining in both mar-
kets. We apply a standard Nash bargaining model where an agent receives his reservation
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value plus a share of the match surplus such that the rms share is  and the workers
share is 1  ; where  is a parameter. This is equivalent of a procedure where the rm
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er with an exogenous probability  2 [0; 1] and the worker
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er with probability 1  .
The model can in principle exhibit three kind of equilibrium: In CM equilibrium
all agents choose the centralized market, and in SM-equilibrium all agents choose the
decentralized search market. In MM equilibrium (MM stands for mixed market) there
are agents in both markets. Let Vc and Vs denote a vacancys expected value in CM
and SM, respectively, and let Uc and Us denote an unemployed workers expected values.
An MM equilibrium exists only if both type of agents are indi¤erent between the two
markets. That is, the expected value of going to CM must be equal to the expected value
of going to SM. Then Uc = Us  0; and Vc = Vs = 0 by free entry and exit. Which
equilibrium prevails depends on parameters ; k;  and b: I will focus on the relation
between  and k; keeping  and b xed.
The existence of CM equilibrium and SM equilibrium will be tested by using a one-
period coalitional deviation. It is an application of a Nash equilibrium where a deviation
by a single agent is replaced by a deviation by a coalition of vacancies and unemployed.
This is because a deviation of a single agent into the other market is futile since a match
is formed by two agents of di¤erent types.
The value functions for matched agents are
Wc = wc +  ((1  b)Wc + bUc) ; (1)
Ws = ws +  ((1  b)Ws + bUs) ; (2)
Jc = 1  k   wc +  ((1  b) Jc + bVc) ; (3)
Js = 1  k   ws +  ((1  b) Js + bVs) : (4)
On the rst line, Wc is the value for a worker who is just hired in the centralized market.
He earns wage wc for one period. In the beginning of the second period he continues
working with probability 1  b: He becomes unemployed with probability b; goes to back
the centralized market and has value Uc: The second line is the value function of a worker
who is just hired in the search market. After becoming unemployed he goes to the search
market and has value Us: The third and fourth line depict value functions of a rm which
just hired a worker. The rm receives unit output minus capital cost k minus wage wi,
i = c; s; depending of which market it hired the worker. The rm continues producing
with probability 1   b: Production ends with probability b; and the rm returns to the
centralized market or to the search market and has value Vc or Vs:
First we study the existence of an MM equilibrium and a CM equilibrium if  < k:
Then we study those equilibria if   k: The relative magnitude of  and k determines
whether rms or workers form the larger population in the centralized market. Finally
we study the existence of SM equilibrium.
Setting Vi = 0 gives an often needed expression for a match value: Ji + k +Wi =
1   (1  b) k + bUi
1   (1  b) ; where i = c; s:When considering a deviating coalition in analyzing
CM equilibrium, we use Jds+k+W
d
s =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) :On the right-hand side there
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is Uc because we consider a one-period deviation. When considering an SM equilibrium
we have Jdc + k +W
d
c =
1   (1  b) k + bUs
1   (1  b) for deviators.
3.1 Mixed Market Equilibrium and CM Equilibrium if  < k
In MM equilibrium, fraction  2 (0; 1) of rms and fraction ! 2 (0; 1) of workers choose
SM, and fractions 1  and 1 ! choose CM. Then the ratio of unemployed and vacancies
in CM is
(1  !)u
(1  ) v =
(1  !) 
1    : If  > 1; a worker is matched with probability 1=;
and a rm is matched with probability one. If   1; a worker is matched with probability
one, and a rm is matched with probability : The proof below shows that  > 1 only if
 < k: In SM, workers choose rms at random with equal probability. Then the number
of workers who arrive at a given vacancy is binomially distributed. We assume that u and
v are large, and we use a standard method that the binomial distribution is approximated
by Poisson distribution, as if u ! 1 and v ! 1: This simplies the analysis greatly.
Let  be the Poisson term in SM, then  =
!

where   u
v
:
Consider rst a mixed market where  > 1. The value functions for unmatched agents
are
Uc =
1

(Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc)) +

1  1


Uc; (5)
Us =
1  e 

(Us + (1  ) (Js + k +Ws   Vs)) +

1  1  e
 


Us; (6)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc; (7)
Vs =  k +
 
1  e  ( (Js + k +Ws   Us) + (1  ) Vs) + e Vs: (8)
In (5) ; an unemployed worker is in CM where he meets a rm with probability
1=: With probability  the rm receives all the match surplus, leaving the worker his
continuation value Uc: With probability 1    the worker gets all the match value
Jc + k +Wc minus rms continuation value Vc: Notice that we include k in the match
value in order to not count it twice, because the rm already paid it before they matched.
That is, k is a sunk cost. With probability 1   1= a worker remains unemployed
and continues in CM. Notice also that Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc) = Uc +
(1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc   Uc) : That is, a worker gets his continuation value plus
share 1   of match surplus.
In (6) a worker is in SM where he meets a rm, and he is chosen by it with probability
(1  e ) =: The rm and worker divide the surplus in shares  and 1  : With prob-
ability 1  (1  e ) = the worker is not recruited and he goes back to search market
and gets continuation value Us: In (7) a rm in CM pays capital cost k and meets a
worker. They divide the surplus in shares  and 1  : In (8) a rm in SM pays capital
cost k and meets a worker with probability 1   e ; and they share the surplus. With
probability e  a rm does not get any applicants, and it goes to SM in the next period.
An MM equilibrium exists if rms and workers are indi¤erent between the markets,
rms have zero values, workers have positive values, and the Poisson term in SM is
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positive. That is, an MM equilibrium exists if Uc = Us  0; Vc = Vs = 0; and  > 0:
Proposition 1 (i) If  < k; an MM equilibrium exists if and only if  =
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k :
(ii) In an MM equilibrium  = !:
Proof. (i) The value functions above give Uc = Us and Vc = Vs only if 1   e  = 1
and  =  (1  e ) : Both the equations hold only if  ! 1 and  ! 1: Equa-
tion (5) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
(1   (1  b))+  (1  b) (1  ) if Vc = 0 which holds
by (7) if Uc =
  k +  (1  b) k (1  )
 (1  ) (1  b) : Equating the solutions for Uc gives  =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) k (1  ) . Then  ! 1 if  =
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k . Equation (6) gives
Us =
1  
1  
(1   (1  b) k) (1  e )
 (1  b) (1  ) (1  e ) +  (1   (1  b)) if Vs = 0 which holds by (8)
if Us =
 (1   (1  b) k) (1  e )  (1   (1  b)) k
 (1  ) (1  b) (1  e ) : Equating the solutions for Us
gives  ! 1 and  = (1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k : Notice that
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k < k:(ii) Equation
1

=
1  e 

can be written, using  =

!
; as (1  )! = (1  !)  (1  e ) where
 !1: This gives  = !:
Because   !

,   (1  !) 
1   ; and in a mixed market equilibrium  = !; then
 =  = ; and then  ! 1 and  ! 1 only if  ! 1: Then v ! 0 because
the upper bound of u is L: In a mixed market equilibrium Uc = Us = 0:The expected
utility of unemployed workers is zero because in both markets nding a partner is almost
impossible. A rms probability of nding a partner approaches one in both markets, but
having  =
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k drives a vacancys value to zero. As v ! 0; then u^ ! L in
a steady state, and the total output approaches zero. The relative size of CM and SM is
indeterminate: result  = ! only tells that the fractions of rms and workers that choose
SM are equal. We also nd that if  = 0; an MM equilibrium does not exist if  < k:
Next we study if a CM equilibrium exists if  < k. In this case it follows, as shown in
the proof below, that a rm matches in CM with probability one, and a worker matches
with probability 1= < 1: The value functions for unmatched workers and rms in CM
are
Uc =
1

(Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc)) +

1  1


Uc; (9)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc: (10)
In (9) a worker in CM is chosen by a rm with probability v=u = 1=; and they share the
surplus. With probability 1  1= he is not chosen and goes back to CM in the beginning
of the next period and has thus continuation value Uc: In (10) a rm pays k and receives
applicants. He chooses one at random and they share the surplus.
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Proposition 2 If  < k; a CM equilibrium where  9 1 exists if and only if  >
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k :
Proof. Setting Vc = 0 equation (9) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
(1   (1  b))  +  (1  b) (1  ) ;
and equation (10) gives Uc =
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) : Equating the solutions gives
 =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k > 1 if  < k; and  9 1 if
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k <  < k:
Suppose a coalition of workers and rms deviate for one period to SM so that the Pois-
son term in SM is ~: The value function for a deviating rm is, following (8) above,
V ds =  k +
 
1  e ~    Jds + k +W ds   Uc+ (1  ) Vc+ e ~Vc: Setting Vc = 0
and using Jds + k +W
d
s =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) we have
V ds =  k +
 
1  e ~1   (1  b) k    (1  ) (1  b)Uc
1   (1  b)

: Using
Uc =
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) gives V
d
s =  ke ~ < 0: That is, it does not pay a
rm to participate in a deviating coalition, and then a CM equilibrium exists.
Firms match with probability one; therefore Vc = Jc = 1 k wc+ ((1  b) Jc + bVc) :
Setting Vc = 0 gives wc = 1   k: If  = 0; a CM equilibrium does not exist if  < k
because condition
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k <  < k becomes k <  < k:
3.2 Mixed Market Equilibrium and CM Equilibrium if   k
In the previous case  > 1 was supported i¤  < k: If   k; then we have   1:
Then in CM a worker matches with probability one, and a rm matches with probability
  1: The value functions for unmatched agents are
Uc = Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc) ; (11)
Us =
1  e 

(Us + (1  ) (Js + k +Ws   Vs)) +

1  1  e
 


Us; (12)
Vc =  k +  ( (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc) + (1  ) Vc; (13)
Vs =  k +
 
1  e  ( (Js + k +Ws   Us) + (1  ) Vs) + e Vs; (14)
with the now familiar interpretations.
Proposition 3 An MM equilibrium does not exist if   k.
Proof. Setting Vc = Vs = 0; equations (11) and (12) give Uc = Us only if 1  e  = 
which holds i¤  = 0:Then ! = 0 or  = 0: If ! = 0, SM has no workers. If  = 0; then
u = 0; which is possible only if all workers match in CM, which means that SM has no
workers.
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Next we study whether a CM equilibrium exists. Assuming   k gives   1 as
shown in the proof below. Then a worker matches in CM with probability one, and a
rm matches with probability   1: The value functions for unmatched agents are
Uc = Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc) ; (15)
Vc =  k +  ( (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc) + (1  ) Vc: (16)
Again, the only di¤erence to the case  < k is that a worker matches with probability
one and a rm matches with probability   1:
Proposition 4 A CM equilibrium exists if   k:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that it is not protable for a worker to participate in
a deviating coalition. Setting Vc = 0 equation (15) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b);
and (16) gives Uc =
(1   (1  b) k)   (1   (1  b)) k
 (1  ) (1  b) . Equating the solutions gives
 =
(1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k): Then  < 1 if  > k; and  = 1 if  = k: Suppose a coalition of
rms and workers deviates for one period to SM where the Poisson term is ~: The value
function for a deviating worker is Uds =
1  e ~
~
 
Uc + (1  )
 
Jds + k +W
d
s   Vc

+
1  1  e
 ~
~

Uc. Setting Vc = 0 and using Jds + k +W
d
s =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) and
Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) gives U
d
s =
1
~
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b)
 
(1  )  1  e ~+ ~ :
Then Uds   Uc =
1  
~
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b)
 
1  ~   e ~ < 0 if ~ > 0: That is, it does not
pay to a worker to participate in a deviating coalition, thus a CM equilibrium exists.
Next we solve the equilibrium wage. The value function for a matched rm is Jc =
1 k wc+ ((1  b) Jc + bVc) : Setting Vc = 0 gives Jc = 1  k   wc
1   (1  b) :The value function
for an unmatched rm is Vc =  k +  (Jc + k) + (1  ) Vc. Setting Vc = 0 gives Jc =
k (1  )

: Then
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) =
k (1  )

gives wc = 1   (1  b) k  1

(1   (1  b)) k:
Using  =
(1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k) gives wc =
(1  ) (1   (1  b) k)
1   (1  b) :
3.3 SM Equilibrium
Consider next whether a decentralized market equilibrium exists. The Poisson term in
SM is : The value functions for unmatched agents are
Us =
1  e 

(Us + (1  ) (Js + k +Ws   Vs)) +

1  1  e
 


Us; (17)
Vs =  k +
 
1  e  ( (Js + k +Ws   Us) + (1  ) Vs) + e Vs: (18)
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They are replications of (12) and (14) except that the Poisson term is   u=v instead
of   !

: Setting Vs = 0; equation (17) gives
Us =
1  
1  
(1   (1  b) k)  1  e 
 (1  b) (1  ) (1  e ) + (1   (1  b))  ; (19)
and (18) gives
Us =
(1   (1  b) k)  1  e   (1   (1  b)) k
 (1  ) (1  e ) (1  b) : (20)
Equating the solutions gives
 =
 
(1   (1  b))  +  (1  b)  1  e  k
(1  e ) ( (1  b) k +  (1   (1  b) k)) ; (21)
which determines the equilibrium value of  implicitly as a function of ; b;  and k:
The equilibrium is checked against a coalitional deviation. Suppose a coalition of v
rms and u workers can deviate to CM for one period. In CM all agents on the short
side match. An SM-equilibrium does not exist if there is a coalition where its members
fare at least as well as in SM.
Proposition 5 An SM equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. Suppose u > v: Then in CM a rm matches with probability one, and
a worker matches with probability d = = < 1: The value function for a deviating
rm is V dc =  k + 
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Us

+ (1  ) Vs: A workers continuation value
is Us because the coalition deviates for one period only. Setting Vs = 0 and using
Jdc+k+W
d
c =
1   (1  b) k + bUs
1   (1  b) and (20) gives V
d
c =
ke 
1  e  > 0. The value function
for a deviating worker is Udc = 
d
 
Us + (1  )
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Vs

+
 
1  d Us:
Then, setting Vs = 0; we have
Udc   Us =

d +
d (1  ) b
1   (1  b) +
 
1  d    1Us + d (1  ) (1   (1  b) k)
1   (1  b) :
Using (20) and (21) gives Udc   Us =
e  + d   1
1  e 
1  k   (1   (1  b) k) e 
 (1  b) (1  e ) + (1   (1  b)) 
where 1   k   (1   (1  b) k) e  > 0 because  < 1:Then Udc  Us if d 
1  e 

;
that is, if a workers matching probability in CM is larger than in SM. This is satised
if =  1   e : This holds together with u > v if 1   e   = < : A deviating
coalition exists for all  > 0:
One can show that there are also coalitions where u < v or u = v such that
Udc > Us and V
d
c > 0: There is a CM equilibrium if  >
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k ; and an
MM equilibrium if  =
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k : An SM equilibrium does not exist. If  <
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(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k ; there is no equilibrium with rms in the economy. Figure 1 depicts the
equilibria.
CM
CM
CM
No eq.No activeeq.
0
1
k
α
1
1
MM
Figure 1: Equilibria when wages are determined by bargaining in the decentralized
market
3.4 E¢ ciency
The total net output per worker is Q =
(L  u^) (1  k)  v^k
L
; where u^ and v^ are the
numbers of unemployed and vacancies during a production period, that is, between the
matching stages. Given that a CM equilibrium exists, the net production of the economy
is a function of parameters ; k,  and b: A larger  induces more rms into the economy,
leading to a higher employment and total production, but it also increases the total capital
cost. A smaller k also induces more rms and increases employment, at a lower capital
cost per rm-worker pair. Consider a planner who takes k,  and b as given and chooses
 in order to maximize total net output per worker.
Proposition 6 The total net output per worker is maximal if  = k:
Proof. Consider cases  < k;  > k and  = k:
(i) Let  < k; then  > 1 in a CM equilibrium. A worker matches with prob-
ability 1=; and a rm matches with probability one. The number of unemployed in
the beginning of a matching stage is u = u^ + b (L  u^) ; where b (L  u^) is the num-
ber of workers that becomes unemployed after a production period. In a steady state
u
1

= b (L  u^) : Then (u^+ b (L  u^)) 1

= b (L  u^) gives u^ = (   1) bL
1 + b (   1) : Using
 =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k gives u^ =
(k   ) bL
(1  b) (  k +  (1  ) k) : Because rms
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match with probability one, then v^ = 0; and the net production per worker in steady
state is Q  1
L
(L  u^) (1  k) = (1  k) (  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k)
(1  b) (  k +  (1  ) k) : Then we have
@Q
@
=
bk
1  b
(1  k)2
((1  ) k   (1  k))2 > 0:
(ii) Let  > k; then  < 1 in a CM equilibrium. A rm matches with probability ;
and a worker matches with probability one. During a production period v^ > 0 and u^ = 0:
Then v = v^ + b (L  u^) = v^ + bL: In a steady state v = bL; then  (v^ + bL) = bL gives
v^ =
bL

  bL: The net production per worker in steady state is Q  1
L
(L (1  k)  v^k) =
1
L

L (1  k) 

bL

  bL

k

= 1  (1  b) k   bk

: Using  =
(1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k) gives
Q =
(1  k) (1   (1  b))  b (  k)
1   (1  b) > 0 because  <
1  (1  b) k
 (1  b) (1  k) + b:We have
@Q
@
=  (1   (1  b) k) b
(1   (1  b))2 < 0.
(iii) Let  = k; then  = 1;and then u^ = v^ = 0; and then Q = 1   k which is the
largest Q possible. If  6= k then  6= 1; and then either u^ > 0 or v^ > 0; and then
Q < 1  k:
4 Bargaining in CM and Wage Posting in SM
In this section a match surplus is shared by Nash bargaining solution in CM, but in
SM rms post wages publicly. I apply a result in Kultti (1999) which shows that in a
large market wage posting is utilitywise equivalent to an auction where a rm gets its
reservation value if no workers or only one worker visits it. If at least two workers visit
the rm, the rm gets the value of the match minus the reservation value of the worker.
The equivalence result simplies the analysis considerably.
Consider for a moment a static model where the reservation values are zero. Assume
that there is a xed number of identical rms, and the workers observe them all. Each
worker chooses one rm at random. The number of workers arriving a given rm is
then binomially distributed. It is assumed that the numbers of rms and workers are
large, and the binomial distribution is approximated by Poisson distribution. Denote the
unemployment-vacancy ratio by . Then the probability that a rm receives no applicants
is e ; the probability that it receives one applicant is e ; and the probability that it
receives at least two applicants is 1  e    e : The probability for a worker of being
the only applicant to a rm it contacted is e ; and then 1  e  is the probability that
the worker has at least one rival applicant. Setting the match value to unity the expected
utility of a rm is V = 1  e    e ; and the utility of a worker is U = e :
Suppose then that rms attract workers by posting wages publicly so that all agents
observe them. Workers choose between rms based on wages. A larger wage is bal-
anced against larger probability of receiving at least one applicant. Consider a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium where each rm posts w: Following Kultti (1999)1 we have w =
1The idea of the proof is to consider a subset of rms that deviates by posting w0 instead of w posted
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e = (1  e ) : The expected utility of an unemployed worker is the probability of being
hired times the wage. As the former equals (1  e ) =, the expected utility of a worker
is U = w (1  e ) = = e : The expected utility of a rm is V = (1  e ) (1  w)
where the rst term is the probability that a rm meets at least one worker. Using the
equation for wage above we have V = 1   e    e : The expected utilities are thus
the same as in the auction model. In the rest of the paper I assume that the number of
rms is determined by entry and exit such that the expected value of a vacancy is zero.
Also, the model is dynamic.
Equations (1)   (4) hold here, too. As in the previous model, in a mixed market
equilibrium fraction  2 (0; 1) of rms and fraction ! 2 (0; 1) of workers choose SM, and
fractions 1    and 1   ! choose CM. In SM the Poisson term is  = != : In CM, let
  (1  !) = (1  ) : If  > 1; a worker is matched with probability 1=, and a rm is
matched with probability one. If   1; a worker is matched with probability one, and
a rm is matched with probability :
4.1 Mixed Market Equilibrium and CM Equilibrium if  < k
Let us rst study a mixed market where in CM a worker matches with probability 1= < 1
and a rm matches with probability one. This is possible only if  < k as shown in the
rst proof below. We label this equilibrium as MM1. The value functions for unmatched
agents are
Uc = (1=) (Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc)) + (1  1=) Uc; (22)
Us = e
  (Js + k +Ws   Vs) +
 
1  e  Us; (23)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc; (24)
Vs =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vs +
 
1  e    e  (Js + k +Ws   Us) : (25)
The value functions for agents in CM, (22) and (24) ; are the same as (5) and (7) :
Equation (23) gives an unemployed workers value function in SM. He contacts a rm,
and he is the only applicant with probability e ; and he receives the match value minus
rms reservation value Vs: With probability 1   e  he has at least one rival, and he
gets his reservation utility Us: In (25) a rm in SM pays capital cost k; and receives no
applicants or just one applicant with probability e  + e ; then it gets its reservation
value Vs: With probability 1  e    e  the rm receives at least two applicants and
consequently gets all the match value minus the workers reservation value Us: A mixed
market equilibrium exists if and only if Uc = Us  0; Vc = Vs = 0;  > 1; and  > 0:
Lemma 1 If  < k; a mixed market equilibrium exists if and only if  = 1  e  e 
where the value of  is determined by
1  e    e 
1   (1  b)e  = k: (26)
by all other rms, and a subset of workers who choose the deviating rms. Then we let the sizes of the
subsets to approach zero.
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Proof. Setting Vc = 0 equation (22) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
 (1  b) (1  ) + (1   (1  b));
and (24) gives Uc =
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) : The solutions are equal i¤
 =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k : Then  > 1 if
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k <  < k: Setting
Vs = 0 equation (23) gives Us =
e  (1   (1  b) k)
(1  ) (1   (1  b) (1  e )) ; and (25) gives
Us =
1  k   (1   (1  b) k) e  (1 + )
 (1  ) (1  b) (1  e  (1 + )) : Equating the solutions gives (26) :Setting
Vc = Vs = 0 and Uc = Us, equations (24) and (25) give 1 e  e  = : This together
with (26) determines the equilibrium.
A rm is indi¤erent between CM and SM only if the match surplus times a rms
probability of receiving it are the same in both markets. The match surpluses are equal
only if workers are indi¤erent between the markets. The latter holds together with free
entry of rms only if  = 1   e    e : The larger k the larger must  be in MM1
equilibrium: We have
d
dk
> 0 by
1  e    e 
1   (1  b)e  = k; and @ (1  e
    e ) =@ > 0:
Then
d
dk
=
@ (1  e    e )
@
d
dk
> 0: Equation (26) gives  = 0 if k = 0 and  ! 1
if k = 1: Equation 1  e    e  =  gives  = 0 if  = 0 if and  = 1 if  !1. Then
the equilibrium locus (; k) starts at (0; 0) and ends at (1; 1) :
Proposition 7 There is a continuum of mixed market equilibria where wc = 1   k; !
=

1   +  < ;  = 1 + ; and  = 1    + , where the value of  is determined by
(26) :
Proof. Using (26) and  = 1  e    e  we have
 =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k = 1 + : Then  > 0 if
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k <  < k:
Matching identity (1  !)u1

+!u
1  e 

= (1  ) v+ v (1  e ) and  = 1+ give
 =
 (1 + ) (1  e )
 + ! (1  e    e ) : Also,  =

!
: The two equations for  give ! =

1   +  <
: Then  = 1   + :
Consider then a CM equilibrium where a worker matches with probability 1= < 1;
and a rm matches with probability one. This happens if  < k, as shown in the rst
proof below. We label this equilibrium as CM1. The value functions for unmatched
agents are
Uc = (1=) (Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc)) + (1  1=) Uc; (27)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc; (28)
which are as(22) and (24) where  is replaced by : Setting Vc = 0 and using Jc+k+Wc =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) ; equation (27) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
 (1  b) (1  ) + (1   (1  b))  ;
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and (28) gives Uc =
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) : The solutions are equal if
 =
 (1  b) (1  ) k
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k : Then  > 0 if  >
(1   (1  b)) k
1   (1  b) k ; and  > 1 if
 < k:
Proposition 8 If  < k; a CM equilibrium exists if  > ~ where ~ = 1  e ~0   ~0e ~0
where the value of ~0 is determined by
1  e ~0   ~0e ~0
1   (1  b) ~0e ~0 = k:
Proof. Assume a group of v rms and u workers can deviate to SM for one pe-
riod. The Poisson term in SM is ~ = =: The value functions for deviating agents
are Uds = e
 ~  Jds + k +W ds   Vc +  1  e ~ Uc and V ds =  k +  e ~ + ~e ~ Vc + 
1  e ~   ~e ~  Jds + k +W ds   Uc : A deviating group exists only if Uds  Uc and
V ds  0. Setting Vc = 0 and using Jds + k + W ds =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) and Uc =
  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) ; we have V
d
s =
k

 
1  e ~   ~e ~    ; and Uds   Uc = 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~ k   (1   (1  b) k)
 (1  b) . We have V
d
s  0 if (i) 1 e ~ ~e ~  ;
and Uds  Uc if (ii)
 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~ k
1   (1  b) k  : The LHS of (i) increases in ~; and
the LHS of (ii) decreases in ~: Let ~ = 1  e ~0   ~0e ~0 =
 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~0 k
1   (1  b) k :
Suppose  > ~: Then V ds  0 i¤ ~  ~1 where ~1 satises 1   e ~1   ~1e ~1 = ;
and Uds  Uc if ~  ~2 where ~2 satises
 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~2 k
1   (1  b) k = : But ~2 < ~1
because  > ~:Then V ds  0 and Uds  Uc cannot both hold, and then a CM equilibrium
exists. If  < ~, then V ds  0 if ~  ~3 where ~3 satises 1   e ~3   ~3e ~3 = ; and
Uds  Uc if ~  ~4 where ~4 satises
 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~4 k
1   (1  b) k = : We have ~3 < ~4
because  < ~:Then all ~ 2 (~3; ~4) give V ds > 0 and Uds > Uc:Then if  < ~, a devi-
ating group exists, and a CM equilibrium does not exist. Finally, 1   e ~0   ~0e ~0 = 
1   (1  b)  1  e ~0 k
1   (1  b) k gives
1  e ~0   ~0e ~0
1   (1  b) ~0e ~0 = k: If  = ~; a mixed market
equilibrium exists.
If  is smaller than k but large enough, there is no group of rms and workers such
that all its members can benet from choosing the decentralized market instead of the
centralized market. If one group benets, the other group necessarily looses. The lower
bound ~ of a rms surplus share in CM equals the probability that a deviating rm
receives at least two applicants in SM.
In CM equilibrium we have
1  e ~0   ~0e ~0
1   (1  b) ~0e ~0 = k; and in MM equilibrium we
have
1  e    e 
1   (1  b)e  = k: Then ~0 = : Then the locus (; k) which determines MM
14
equilibrium determines also the lower boundary for  in CM equilibrium.
4.2 Mixed Market Equilibrium and CM Equilibrium if   k
Consider rst a mixed market equilibrium where  > k: Then a rm matches in CM
submarket with probability  < 1 as shown in the rst proof below, and a worker
matches with probability one. We label this equilibrium as MM2. The value functions
for unmatched agents are
Uc = Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc) ; (29)
Us = e
  (Js + k +Ws   Vs) +
 
1  e  Us; (30)
Vc =  k +  ( (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc) + (1  ) Vc; (31)
Vs =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vs +
 
1  e    e  (Js + k +Ws   Us) ; (32)
with the familiar interpretations from the case  < k: A mixed market equilibrium exists
if Vc = Vs = 0, Uc = Us  0, 0 <  < 1;and  > 0:
Lemma 2 A mixed market equilibrium exists if and only if  = 1  e  where the value
of  is determined by (26) :
Proof. Assume rst  > k: Setting Vc = 0 equation (29) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b);
and (31) gives Uc =
(1   (1  b) k)  (1   (1  b)) k
 (1  ) (1  b) : The solutions to Uc are equal
i¤  =
(1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k): Then  < 1 if  > k: Setting Vs = 0 equation (30) gives Us =
(1   (1  b) k) e 
(1  ) (1   (1  b) (1  e )) ; and (32) gives
Us =
1  e    e    (1   (1  b) (1 + ) e ) k
 (1  ) (1  b) (1  e    e ) : Equating the solutions to Us
gives (26), and then Us =
e 
(1  ) (1   (1  b)e ) : Setting Vc = Vs = 0 and Uc = Us;
equations (29) and (30) give (ii)  = 1   e : Then assume  = k: Then (26) and
 = 1  e  hold only if  (1  b) = 1
1  e  > 1; and then a mixed market equilibrium
does not exist.
Because  = 1  e  and 1  e
    e 
1   (1  b)e  = k, a mixed market equilibrium exists
if  and k are on locus k =
+ (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) : The equilibrium locus (; k)
begins at (0; 0) and ends at (1; 1) ; and
dk
d
=
 (1  b)  (1   (1  b)) ln (1  )
(1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ))2 > 0:
Proposition 9 There is a continuum of mixed market equilibria where
wc =
1  
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) , ! =
  ln (1  )
(1  )+ (1     ) ln (1  ) >  ,
 = 1 +
1

(1  ) ln (1  ) ; and  = 1   + 1

(1     ) ln (1  ) :
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Proof. Because a worker matches with probability one in CM, then Uc =
wc
1   :
Equalizing this with Us =
e 
(1  ) (1   (1  b)e ) gives wc =
e 
1   (1  b)e  :
Using (26) and  = 1  e  we have  = (1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k) =
1  e    e 
1  e  : Matching
identity (1  !)u+!u1  e
 

= (1  ) v+ v (1  e ) and  = 1  e
    e 
1  e  give
 =
(1  ) (1  e    e ) +  (1  e )2
(1  !) (1  e ) + ! (1  e )2 : Also,  =

!
: Then
! =
 (1  e )
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) > ;and  =
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
1  e  .
Using  = 1  e  we end up with the proposition above.
In a CM equilibrium where  > k; a worker matches with probability one, and a rm
matches with probability  < 1, as shown below. Let us label this equilibrium as CM2.
The value functions for unmatched agents are
Uc = Uc + (1  ) (Jc + k +Wc   Vc) ; (33)
Vc =  k +  ( (Jc + k +Wc   Uc) + (1  ) Vc) + (1  ) Vc: (34)
Setting Vc = 0; equation (33) gives Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b); and (34) gives Uc =
(1   (1  b) k)   (1   (1  b)) k
 (1  ) (1  b) : Equating the solutions gives  =
(1   (1  b)) k
(1   (1  b) k):
If  > k , then  < 1:
Proposition 10 A CM equilibrium exists i¤  < 1  e ^ where the value of ^ is given
by
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k:
Proof. Assume v rms and u workers form a group which deviates to SM for
one period. The Poisson term in the deviating market is  = =: The value func-
tions for deviators are Uds = e
   Jds + k +W ds   Vc + (1  e ) Uc and V ds =  k +
(e  + e ) Vc+(1  e    e )
 
Jds + k +W
d
s   Uc

: A deviating group exists only
if Uds  Uc and V ds  0. Setting Vc = 0 and using Jds+k+W ds =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) and
Uc =
1  
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) we have V
d
s =  k+(1  e    e )
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b):We have
@V ds
@
> 0; and
@V ds
@
> 0: Then V ds > 0 if  >
k   (1   (1  b) k) (1  e    e )
 (1  b) k : Also,
Uds  Uc = (+ e    1)
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b):We have
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
> 0 and
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
< 0:
Then Uds > Uc if  > 1   e : Let ^ satisfy
k   (1   (1  b) k)  1  e ^   ^e ^
 (1  b) k =
1 e ^. This gives 1  e
 ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k: Then V
d
s = 0 and U
d
s = Uc at ^ if  = 1 e ^;
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and V ds > 0 and U
d
s > Uc at ^ if  > 1   e ^: Suppose  > 1   e ^: Then V ds > 0 and
Uds > Uc if  2 (1; 2) where 1 < ^ < 2 and where V ds = 0 at 1 and Uds = Uc at
2: Then a protable deviating coalition exists. Suppose  < 1  e ^. Then Uds > Uc if
 < 3; and V ds > 0 if  > 4 where 3 < 4: Then a protable deviating coalition does
not exist.
Equations (26) and  = 1  e  give k = + (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) where RHS
increases in : We have V ds > 0 and U
d
s > Uc only if  is large enough. Then V
d
s > 0
and Uds > Uc only if k <
+ (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) : Then a CM2 equilibrium exists
if k >
+ (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) : A CM2 equilibrium exists also if  = k because
 >
+ (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) :
4.3 SM Equilibrium
Consider next a decentralized market equilibrium. The Poisson parameter in SM is
u=v  : The value functions for unmatched agents are
Us = e
  (Js + k +Ws   Vs) +
 
1  e  Us; (35)
Vs =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vs +
 
1  e    e  (Js + k +Ws   Us) : (36)
Setting Vs = 0 and using Js + k +Ws =
1   (1  b) k + bUs
1   (1  b) ; (35) gives
Us =
e 
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) (1  e ) ; (37)
and (36) gives
Us =
1  k   (1   (1  b) k) (1 + ) e 
 (1  ) (1  b) (1  e    e ) : (38)
Equating the solutions for Us yields
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k: This determines the equilib-
rium value of .
Proposition 11 An SM equilibrium exists if  < 1  e    e  or  > 1  e ; where
the value of  is determined by
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k:
Proof. Suppose that a coalition of u workers and v rms can deviate for one pe-
riod to CM. We study cases u > v; u < v; and u = v; and we use Jdc + k+W
d
c =
1   (1  b) k + bUs
1   (1  b) and
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k:(i) Suppose u > v: Then in CM a rm
matches with probability one, and a worker matches with probability d = = < 1: The
value functions for deviating agents are Udc = 
d
 
Us + (1  )
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Vs

+
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 
1  d Us and V dc =  k+  Jdc + k +W dc   Us+(1  ) Vs. Setting Vs = 0 and us-
ing (37) and the above condition for k gives V dc =
+ e  + e    1
1   (1  b) e  < 0 if  < 1 e
  
e . Setting Vs = 0 and using (37) gives Udc   Us =
 
d (1  )  e  (1   (1  b) k)
1   (1  b) (1  e )
< 0 if  > 1 e
 
d
. Using d = = we have Udc < Us if  > 1 


e : Because = < 1;
then 1  e  > 1  

e . Then Udc < Us if  > 1  e : Then a deviating coalition does
not exist if  < 1 e  e  or  > 1 e : (ii) Suppose u < v: Then in CM a worker
matches with probability one, and a rm matches with probability d = = < 1: The
value functions for deviating agents are Udc = Us + (1  )
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Vs

and
V dc =  k+d
 

 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Us

+ (1  ) Vs

+
 
1  d Vs. Setting Vs = 0 and
using (37) gives Udc   Us =
(1   (1  b) k)  1    e 
1   (1  b) (1  e ) < 0 if  > 1   e
 . Setting
Vs = 0 and using (37) and the condition for k gives V dc =
d + e  + e    1
1   (1  b) e  < 0 if
d < 1   e    e : Because d < 1; the latter holds if  < 1   e    e : Here,
too, a deviating coalition does not exist if  < 1   e    e  or  > 1   e . (iii)
Suppose u = v: Then both rms and workers match in CM with probability one. The
value functions of deviating agents are Udc = Us + (1  )
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Vs

and
V dc =  k + 
 
Jdc + k +W
d
c   Us

+ (1  ) Vs. Setting Vs = 0 and using (37) gives
Udc   Us =
(1   (1  b) k)  1    e 
1   (1  b) (1  e ) < 0 if  > 1   e
 . Setting Vs = 0 and using
(37) and the condition for k gives V dc =
+ e  + e    1
1   (1  b) e  < 0 if  < 1   e
    e :
Again, a deviating coalition does not exist if  < 1  e    e  or  > 1  e . By (i) -
(iii) a deviating coalition cannot exist if  < 1  e    e  or  > 1  e ; and then an
SM equilibrium exists.
Notice that using
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k condition  > 1   e
  is equivalent to
k <
+ (1  ) ln (1  )
1 +  (1  b) (1  ) ln (1  ) : Notice that if  < 1   e
    e ; then  < k
because  < 1   e    e  =  1   (1  b) e  k < k: If  > 1   e , then  > k
because  > 1  e  =  1   (1  b) e  k+ e  > k: An SM equilibrium exists either
if a rms probability of receiving at least two applicants in SM is larger than its surplus
share in CM, or if a workers probability of being the sole applicant to a particular rm
is larger than his surlpus share in CM. If  < k; the locus of an MM equilibrium is also
the lower boundary of CM equilibrium and the upper boundary of SM equilibrium. If
 > k; the locus of MM equilibrium is also the upper boundary of CM equilibrium and
the lower boundary of SM equilibrium. Figure 2 depicts the equilibria.
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Figure 2: Equilibria when wages are determined by posting in the decentralized market
4.4 E¢ ciency
In this section we compare the total net output per worker, Q; in di¤erent equilibria. We
have Q =
(L  u^) (1  k)  v^k
L
: We x , b; and k; and we let  change. As  increases
from zero to one, the equilibrium changes from SM to MM1 to CM to MM2 and nally
back to SM.
In a CM equilibrium Q equals that in the model where there is bargaining in both
markets: If  < k; then QCM1 =
(1  k) (  k +  (1  b) (1  ) k)
(1  b) (  k + k (1  )) : If  > k then
QCM2 =
(1  k) (1   (1  b))  b (  k)
1   (1  b) : If  = k; then QCM3 = 1   k, which
is the highest possible output. In an SM equilibrium there are both unemployed and
vacancies during a production period. In the beginning of a matching stage the number of
unemployed is u = u^+ b (L  u^) ; and the number of vacancies is v = v^+ b (L  u^) ;where
u^ and v^ are the numbers of unemployed and vacancies in a production period. Then
v^ = v   b (L  u^) : Also,   u
v
=
u^+ b (L  u^)
v^ + b (L  u^) gives v^ =
u^+ (1  ) b (L  u^)

. The
equations for v^ give u^ =
v   bL
1  b : In a steady state u
1  e 

= b (L  u^) ; which gives
u^ = L   1
b
 
1  e  v : Equating the solutions for u^ gives v = bL
(1  b) (1  e ) + b ,
and then u^ =
v   bL
1  b gives u^ =
 
 + e    1 bL
(1  b) (1  e ) + b . Then v^ = v   b (L  u^) =
e bL
(1  b) (1  e ) + b . Plugging the solutions for u^ and v^ into Q =
(L  u^) (1  k)  v^k
L
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yields QSM =
(1  k)  1  e   bke 
(1  b) (1  e ) + b : Using
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k yields QSM = 
1  e  e  (1  b+ (1   (1  b)) ) + be 2
((1  b) (1  e ) + b) (1   (1  b) e ) .
In an MM equilibrium we have, like in an SM equilibrium, v^i =
u^i + (1  i) b (L  u^i)
i
and u^i =
vii   bL
1  b , where i = 1 denotes MM1-equilibrium, and i = 2 denotes MM2
equilibrium.
(i) In MM1 rms match with probability one in CM submarket. In a steady state
v1 (1  e )+(1  ) v1 = b (L  u^1) ; which gives u^1 = 1
b
(bL  v1 + v1e ) : Equating
the solutions for u^1 gives v1 =
bL
b1 + (1  b) (1  e ) :Then u^1 =
(1 + e
    1) bL
b1 + (1  b) (1  e )
and v^1 =
e bL
b1 + (1  b) (1  e ) : Using i =

!i
and !1 =

1   +  we have QMM1 =
(1  k) (1  e )  bke 
(1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ) :
(ii) In MM2 rms match with probability  < 1 in the CM submarket. In a steady
state v2 (1  e ) + (1  ) v2 = b (L  u^2) ; which gives
u^2 =
1
b
(bL+ v2 (+ e
    1)  v2) : Equating the solutions for u^2 gives v2 =
bL
b2 + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) : Then u^2 =
(2   +  (+ e    1)) bL
b2 + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) ,
and using this gives v^2 =
((1  ) (1  ) + e ) bL
b2 + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) : Using the solutions for
u^2 and v^2 gives QMM2 =
( (1  e ) +  (1  )) (1  k)  ((1  ) (1  ) + e ) bk
(1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) + b2 :
Using i =

!i
;  =
1  e    e 
1  e  , and !2 =
 (1  e )
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) we
have QMM2 =
(1  e ) (1  k)  e  ((1  ) +  (1  e )) (1  (1  b) k)
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e )) :
Then QMM2  QMM1 = b (1  ) (1  e
    e    k (1  (1  b)e ))
(1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e )))
((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ))
.
Using (26) gives QMM2  QMM1
=
(1  ) (1  ) b (1  b)2e  (1  e    e )
(1   (1  b)e )

1  e    e 
+ ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e ))

((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ))
> 0:
Remark 1 QMM2 > QMM1:
The net outputs in the di¤erent equilibria have the following order: QMM1 < QSM <
QMM2 < QCM2: Also, QCM1 = QSM if  = ~; QCM1 < QSM if  < ~; and QCM1 > QSM
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if  > ~:We use the facts that in an MM equilibrium (26) holds, and in SM equilibrium
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k: Then  in an MM equilibrium equals  in an SM equilibrium.
(i) We have QSM > QMM1:
QSM   QMM1 = (1  ) b (1  e
    e    (1  (1  b)e ) k)
((1  b) (1  e ) + b)
((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ))
: Using (26) gives
QSM  QMM1 = (1  ) (1  ) b (1  b)e
  (1  e    e )
(1   (1  b)e ) ((1  b) (1  e ) + b)
((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ))
> 0:
(ii) We have QMM2 > QSM :
QMM2  QSM = (1  ) b ( + e
    1) (1  e    e    k (1  (1  b)e ))
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
(e  + b (1  e ))

((1  b) (1  e ) + b)
:
Using (26) yields
QMM2  QSM = (1  ) (1  ) b (1  b)e
  ( + e    1) (1  e    e )
(1   (1  b)e )

1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
(e  + b (1  e ))

((1  b) (1  e ) + b)
> 0:
(iii) We have QCM2 > QMM2:
First,
@QCM2
@
=
 b (1   (1  b) k)
(1   (1  b))2 < 0. LetQl2  lim!1 e QCM2 where
1  e    e 
1   (1  b)e  =
k: That is, Ql2 is the net output in CM2 if  approaches the MM2 locus. Then
Ql2 =
(1  k) (1   (1  b) (1  e ))  b (1  e    k)
1   (1  b) (1  e ) < QCM2: Then we have
Ql2  QMM2 =
=
((1  k) (1   (1  b) (1  e ))  b (1  e    k))
(1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e )))
 

(1  e ) (1  k)  e  ((1  ) +  (1  e ))
(1  (1  b) k)

(1   (1  b) (1  e ))
(1   (1  b) (1  e ))
(1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e )))
: Using (26) yields
Ql2   QMM2 =  (1  ) b (1  b)e
  (1  e ) ( + e    1)
(1   (1  b)e )

1  e    e 
+ ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e ))
 > 0:
Then QCM2 > QMM2:
(iv) We have QCM1 = QSM if  = ~ , and QCM1 < (>)QSM if  < (>) ~, where ~ 2
(1  e    e ; k). We have @QCM1
@
=
bk (1  k)2
(1  b) ((1  ) k   (1  k))2 > 0. Let Ql1 
lim
!1 e  e 
QCM1 where
1  e    e 
1   (1  b)e  = k: That is, Ql1 is the net output in CM1 if
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 approaches the MM1 locus. ThenQl1 =
(1  k) (1  k   (1   (1  b) k) (1 + ) e )
(1  b) (1  k   (1 + ) e  (1  k)) <
QCM1: Using  =  we have QSM =
(1  k) (1  e )  bke 
(1  b) (1  e ) + b . Using (26) gives
Ql1   QSM = (1  ) b (1  b)e
  (e  + e    1)
(1 + b) (1   (1  b)e ) ((1  b) (1  e ) + b) < 0: Because QCM1
increases in ; and lim
!k
QCM1 = 1  k > QSM ; there exists ~ 2 (1  e    e ; k) such
that QCM1 = QSM if  = ~; and QCM1 < (>)QSM if  < (>) ~.
If  < 1   e    e , a decentralized market equilibrium exists, and there is a
coordination problem but no hold-up problem. If  = 1   e    e ; a mixed market
equilibrium exists, and both sources of ine¢ ciency exist. The total net output per worker
is smaller than in SM equilibrium. If 1   e    e  <  < k, a centralized market
equilibrium exists and there is no coordination problem, but there is a hold-up problem:
there are too few rms. The total net production per worker can be larger or smaller than
in SM, depending on the value of : If k <  < 1  e ; a centralized market equilibrium
exists and there is no hold-up problem, instead there are vacancies but no unemployed
in the production period. The total net production per worker is larger than in SM. If
 = 1  e ; a mixed market equilibrium exists with both sources of ine¢ ciency, but the
total net output per worker is larger than in SM equilibrium. If  > 1   e  then the
equilibrium is SM with coordination problem only.
4.5 A Static Model with Bargaining in CM and Wage Posting
in SM
I briey present the results of a static model where  = 0: The qualitative di¤erence
from the dynamic model is that if  < k; a centralized market equilibrium does not
exist, but a decentralized market equilibrium exists. (i) If  < k; a CM equilibrium
exists only if 1   e ~0   ~0e ~0 <  < k = 1   e ~0   ~0e ~0 which fails to hold. (ii)
If  > k; a CM equilibrium exists if k <  < ~ = 1   e ~0 where the value of ~0 is
determined by 1   e ~0   ~0e ~0 = k: Equation ~ = 1   e ~0 gives ~0 =   ln (1  ~) :
Then we have ~ + (1  ~) ln (1  ~) = k; and a CM equilibrium exists if k <  < ~
where ~ + (1  ~) ln (1  ~) = k: (iii) A CM equilibrium exists if  = k: (iv) An SM
equilibrium exists if  < 1   e    e  or  > 1   e  where the value of  satises
1  e    e  = k: Then an SM equilibrium exists if  < k or if  > ~ where ~ satises
~ + (1  ~) ln (1  ~) = k: (v) An MM equilibrium does not exist if  < k because
 = 1   e    e  and 1   e    e  = k: If  > k; an MM equilibrium exists if
 = 1   e  where  satises 1   e    e  = k: Then an MM equilibrium exists if
+ (1  ) ln (1  ) = k:
5 Wage Posting in CM and in SM
In this section we consider a model where wages are posted in both types of market.
We show rst that there are two continua of mixed market equilibria. Then we study
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centralized market equilibrium and decentralized market equilibrium and show that the
latter does not exist.
5.1 Mixed Market Equilibria
Like before, we study separately the cases where either rms or workers match with
probability one in the centralized submarket.
(i) Assume that in CM submarket a worker matches with probability 1= < 1 and a
rm matches with probability one. The value functions for unmatched agents are
Uc =
1

Wc +

1  1


Uc; (39)
Vc = Jc; (40)
Us = e
  (Js + k +Ws   Vs) +
 
1  e  Us; (41)
Vs =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vs +
 
1  e    e  (Js + k +Ws   Us) : (42)
We have Vc = Jc because a rm in CMmatches with probability one. The value functions
for matched agents are
Wc = wc +  ((1  b)Wc + bUc) ; (43)
Jc = 1  k   wc +  ((1  b) Jc + bVc) ; (44)
Ws = ws +  ((1  b)Ws + bUs) ; (45)
Js = 1  k   ws +  ((1  b) Js + bVs) : (46)
Setting Vc = Vs = 0 gives Wc =
wc + bUc
1   (1  b) ; Jc =
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) ; Ws =
ws + bUs
1   (1  b) ;
and Js =
1  k   ws
1   (1  b) : Also,
Ji + k +Wi =
1   (1  b) k + bUi
1   (1  b) ; i = c; s: (47)
Using Vc = Jc =
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) and setting Vc = 0 gives wc = 1   k: Setting Vs = 0
equations (41) and (42) give (26) :Equations (39) and (43) give, using wc = 1   k, that
Uc =
1  k
(1  ) ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b))) : Equation (41) gives, using Js + k + Ws =
1   (1  b) k + bUs
1   (1  b) ; that Us =
e 
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) (1  e ) . Setting Uc = Us gives
 =
1  (1 +  (1  b) e ) k
e  (1   (1  b) k) . Then using (26) yields  = 1 + :
Proposition 12 If rms in CM set wc = 1  k; there is a continuum of mixed market
equilibria where !1 =

1   +  <  and  = 1 + , where the value of  is determined
by (26).
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Proof. In the above we showed that in a mixed market equilibrium  = 1 + 
where the value of  is determined by (26) : Using  =
(1  !1) 
1   and  =

!1
gives !1
=

1   +  < :
The result is the same as in the model where wages are determined by bargaining in
CM.
(ii) Assume then that in CM submarket a worker matches with probability one, and
a rm matches with probability  < 1: The value functions for matched agents are (43)-
(46) : The value functions for unmatched agents are
Uc = Wc; (48)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k) + (1  ) Vc; (49)
Us = e
  (Js + k +Ws   Vs) +
 
1  e  Us; (50)
Vs =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vs +
 
1  e    e  (Js + k +Ws   Us) : (51)
Set Vc = Vs = 0. Equations (43) and (48)give Uc =
wc
1   : Equations (50) and (47) give
Us =
e 
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) (1  e ) ; and (51) and (47) give
Us =
1  k   (1   (1  b) k) (1 + ) e 
 (1  ) (1  b) (1  e    e ) : Setting the solutions for Us equal we have
(26) ; and then Us =
e 
(1  ) (1   (1  b)e ) : Setting Uc = Us gives
wc =
e 
1   (1  b)e  < 1   k: Setting Vc = 0 gives  =
k
Jc + k
: Using Jc =
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) , (26) ; and wc =
e 
1   (1  b)e  gives  =
1  e    e 
1  e  < 1:
Proposition 13 If rms in CM set wc < 1   k; there is a continuum of mixed market
equilibria where wc =
e 
1   (1  b)e  ; !2 =
 (1  e )
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) > ;
 =
1  e    e 
1  e  ; and  =
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
1  e  ; where the value of  is
given by (26) :
Proof. Same as in the case where there is bargaining in CM.
(iii) Assume that in CM submarket rms and workers match with probability one. The
value functions for matched agents are (43)- (46) ; and the value functions for unmatched
agents are (48) ; (50) ; (51) ; and Vc = Jc: Set Vc = Vs = 0. Then wc = 1  k; Uc = 1  k
1   ;
and Us =
e 
1  
1   (1  b) k
1   (1  b) (1  e ) : Equations (41) and (42) give (26) : Setting Uc =
Us gives k = 1   e . This together with (26) yields 1
1  e  =  (1  b) which cannot
hold since
1
1  e  > 1 and  (1  b) < 1: This leads to
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Proposition 14 There is no mixed market equilibrium where  = 1:
We collect these ndings in
Theorem 1 There exists two continua of mixed market equilibrium (i) A high wage
equilibrium where wc1 = 1   k;  = 1 + , !1 = 
1   +  , and  = 1    + :
(ii) A low wage equilibrium where wc2 =
e 
1   (1  b)e  ;  =
1  e    e 
1  e  ; !2 =
 (1  e )
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) , and  =
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
1  e  ; where !1 <
 < !2: In all mixed market equilibria the value of  is determined by (26) :
If  > 1; then wc is larger than when  < 1: This seems rst counterintuitive because
as  is the worker-rm ratio in CM, a large worker-rm ratio should imply a low wage.
But if  > 1; a rm gets a worker with probability one, and then the free entry condition
implies wc = 1   k: If  < 1; a rm gets a worker with probability less than one, and
then the free entry condition implies that the wage should be smaller than 1  k: Wages
wc1 = 1   k and wc2 = e
 
1   (1  b)e  correspond to the lower and upper MS loci,
respectively, if bargaining is used in CM. If rms post wages in CM, this is equivalent
to making Nash bargaining parameter endogenous. If wc = 1   k; this corresponds to
 = 1   e    e . If wc < 1   k; then wc = e
 
1   (1  b)e  . This corresponds to
 = 1  e :
5.2 CM Equilibrium
We divide the analysis of a centralized market equilibrium in two parts depending on
whether  > 1 or  < 1:
(i) Suppose  > 1:
In CM a worker matches with probability 1= < 1, and a rmmatches with probability
one. The value functions for matched agents are (43) and (44), and the value functions
for unmatched agents are
Vc = Jc =
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) ; (52)
Uc =
1

Wc +

1  1


Uc: (53)
Then Vc = 0 gives wc = 1  k; and (43) and (53) give
Uc =
1  k
(1  ) ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)) ) : (54)
Assume a group of v rms and u workers can deviate to SM for one period. The
Poisson term in the market of deviators is  = =: The value functions for deviating
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agents are
Uds = e
   Jds + k +W ds   Vc+  1  e  Uc; (55)
V ds =  k +
 
e  + e 

Vc +
 
1  e    e   Jds + k +W ds   Uc : (56)
Setting Vc = 0 and using Jds + k +W
d
s =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) and (54)we have
V ds =  k +
 
1  e    e  (1  b) k + (1   (1  b) k) 
 (1  b) + (1   (1  b)) 

; (57)
and
@V ds
@
> 0 and
@V ds
@
> 0: For workers we have
Uds   Uc =
(1   (1  b) k) e  + (1 +  (1  b) e ) k   1
 (1  b) + (1   (1  b))  ; (58)
and
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
< 0 and
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
=
(1  k) (1   (1  b) (1  e ))
( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)) )2 > 0: Then
V ds = 0 if  =
 (1  b) k (1 + ) e 
(1  e    e ) (1   (1  b) k)  (1   (1  b)) k ; and U
d
s = Uc if
 =
1  k    (1  b) ke 
(1   (1  b) k) e  :Then V
d
s = 0 and U
d
s = Uc at ^ if
 (1  b) k (1 + ^) e ^
(1  e ^   ^e ^) (1   (1  b) k)  (1   (1  b)) k =
1  k    (1  b) ke ^
(1   (1  b) k) e ^ , and then
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k. Using this we have ^ = 1+ ^ > 1:That is, V
d
s = 0 and U
d
s = Uc
at

^; ^

: If  > ^; then V ds > 0 and U
d
s > Uc at ^:Then there exists 1 < ^ such that
V ds (1) = 0; and 2 > ^ such that U
d
s (2) = Uc: Then V
d
s  0 and Uds  Uc if  > ^ and
 2 [1; 2] :
Proposition 15 A CM equilibrium exists (does not exist) if  < () 1 + ^ where ^
satises
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k:
Proof. If   1+ ^ where ^ satises 1  e
 ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k; then we nd  2 [1; 2]
such that V ds  0 and Uds  Uc: If  < 1 + ^, then either V ds < 0 or Uds < Uc or both.
(ii) Suppose  < 1:
In CM a worker matches with probability one, and a rm matches with probability
. The value functions for matched agents are (43) and (44) ; and for unmatched agents
we have
Uc = Wc (59)
Vc =  k +  (Jc + k) + (1  ) Vc (60)
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We have Uc =
wc
1   : Setting Vc = 0 gives Jc =
1  k   wc
1   (1  b) ; and then (60) gives
wc = 1 

 (1  b) + 1

(1   (1  b))

k < 1  k: That is, if rms set wc < 1  k; then
 =
(1   (1  b)) k
1  wc    (1  b) k < 1 in equilibrium. Solving for Uc yields
Uc =
(1   (1  b) k)    (1   (1  b)) k
(1  )  : (61)
Notice that
@Uc
@
=
(1   (1  b)) k
(1  ) 2 > 0; given that  < 1: This is because wc increases
in ; which results from rmsfree entry. The larger  the higher the probability that a
rm recruits a worker, and the higher must wc be to satisfy Vc = 0:
Assume again that v rms and u workers form a group which deviates to SM for
one period. The value functions for deviating agents are (55) and (56) : Setting Vc = 0
and using Jds + k +W
d
s =
1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b) and (61) we have
V ds =  k +
 
1  e    e  1

( (1  b) k + (1   (1  b) k) ) : (62)
We have
@V ds
@
> 0; and
@V ds
@
=   k
2
 (1  b) (1  e    e ) < 0:
Setting Vc = 0 yields Uds   Uc = e 
 
Jds + k +W
d
s

+ (1  e ) Uc   Uc =
e 

1   (1  b) k + bUc
1   (1  b)

+ (1  e ) Uc   Uc; and using (61) results in
Uds   Uc =
1

 
k   ( + (1  )  (1  b) k)  1  e  : (63)
We have
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
< 0; and
@
 
Uds   Uc

@
=   k
2
(1   (1  b) (1  e )) < 0:
We have V ds = 0 if  =
 (1  b) k (1  e    e )
k   (1   (1  b) k) (1  e    e ) , and U
d
s = Uc if 
=
(1   (1  b) (1  e )) k
(1   (1  b) k) (1  e ) . Then V
d
s = 0 and U
d
s = Uc at ^ if
 (1  b) k  1  e ^   ^e ^
k   (1   (1  b) k) (1  e ^   ^e ^) =
 
1   (1  b)  1  e ^ k
(1   (1  b) k) (1  e ^) , and then
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k: Using this we have ^ =
1  e ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ < 1:That is, V
d
s = 0
and Uds = Uc at

^; ^

: If  < ^; then V ds > 0 and U
d
s > Uc at ^:Then there exist 1 < ^
such that V ds (1) = 0; and 2 > ^ such that U
d
s (2) = Uc: Then V
d
s  0 and Uds  Uc if
  ^ and  2 [1; 2] :
Proposition 16 A CM equilibrium exists (does not exist) if  > () 1  e
 ^   ^e ^
1  e ^
where ^ satises
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k:
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Proof. If   1  e
 ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ where ^ satises
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k; we nd
 2 [1; 2] such that V ds  0 and Uds  Uc: If  >
1  e ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ then either V
d
s < 0 or
Uds < Uc or both.
We collect the above results as
Theorem 2 Let ^ satisfy
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k: A CM equilibrium exists if
1  e ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ <  < 1 + ^: A CM equilibrium does not exist if   1 + ^ or
  1  e
 ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ :
Proof. If  > 1+ ^ where ^ satises
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k; then we nd  2 (1; 2)
such that V ds > 0 and U
d
s > Uc:If   1 + ^, then either V ds  0 or Uds  Uc: If
 <
1  e ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ where ^ is determined by
1  e ^   ^e ^
1   (1  b) ^e ^ = k; then there exists
 2 (1; 2) such that V ds > 0 and Uds > Uc: If  
1  e ^   ^e ^
1  e ^ then either V
d
s  0
or Uds  Uc:
5.3 SM Equilibrium
The value functions for unmatched agents are (35) and (36) : The value of Us is given
by (37) and (38) ; and making the solutions equal yields
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k: This
determines the equilibrium value of . Suppose that a coalition of u workers and v
rms can deviate for one period to CM where all agents on the short side match. Suppose
u > v; then   u
v
> 1: In CM a worker matches with probability 1= < 1, and
a rm matches with probability one. The value functions for unmatched agents are
Udc = (1=)W
d
c + (1  (1=)) Us; and V dc = Jdc : For the matched agents in CM we have
W dc = w
d
c + 
 
(1  b)W dc + bUs

, and Jdc = 1   k   wdc + 
 
(1  b) Jdc + bVs

: Setting
Vs = 0 gives V dc =
1  k   wdc
1   (1  b) > 0 if w
d
c < 1   k: Using W dc =
wdc + bUs
1   (1  b) gives
Udc   Us =
1

wdc + bUs
1   (1  b)  

1  

1  1


Us > 0 if
wdc > (1  ) ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)))Us. Using (37) gives Udc > Us if wdc >
e  (1   (1  b) k) ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)))
1   (1  b) (1  e ) . Using
1  e    e 
1   (1  b) e  = k we have
Udc > Us if w
d
c >
e  ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)))
1   (1  b) e  , and V
d
c > 0 if w
d
c <
e  (1 +     (1  b) )
1   (1  b) e  .
That is, V dc > 0 and U
d
c > Us only if
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e  ( (1  b) + (1   (1  b)))
1   (1  b) e  < w
d
c <
e  (1 +     (1  b) )
1   (1  b) e  : This holds only if
 < 1 +  , 

< 1 +
1

: Together with  =


> 1; there exists wdc such that V
d
c > 0
and Udc > Us if
1

<


< 1 +
1

: We can state
Proposition 17 An SM equilibrium does not exist because there is a coalition (u; v)
such that V dc > 0 and U
d
c > Us:
5.4 E¢ ciency
Let us compare the net production per worker, Q =
(L  u^) (1  k)  v^k
L
; in the di¤erent
equilibria. Notice that in mixed market equilibrium we have, like in an SM-equilibrium,
v^ =
u^+ (1  ) b (L  u^)

and u^ =
v   bL
1  b :
(i) In a high wage MM equilibrium rms match with probability one in CM sub-
market. In a steady state (1  ) v + v (1  e ) = b (L  u^h) ; which gives u^h =
1
b
(bL  v + ve ) : Setting u^h = vh   bL
1  b gives v =
bL
bh + (1  b) (1  e ) :Then
u^h =
(h + e
    1) bL
bh + (1  b) (1  e ) and v^h =
e bL
bh + (1  b) (1  e ) : Using h =

!h
= 1  
+ gives u^h =
(    (1  e )) bL
b (1   + ) + (1  b) (1  e ) and v^h =
e bL
b (1   + ) + (1  b) (1  e ) :
Then we have Qh =
(1  k) (1  e )  bke 
(1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ) :
(ii) In a low wage MM equilibrium rms match with probability  < 1 in the CM
submarket. In a steady state (1  ) v + v (1  e ) = b (L  u^l) ; which gives u^l =
1
b
(bL+ v (+ e    1)  v) : Setting u^l = vl   bL
1  b gives
v =
bL
bl + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) : Then u^l =
(l   +  (+ e    1)) bL
bl + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) ,
and v^l =
((1  ) (1  ) + e ) bL
bl + (1  b) ( (1  e ) +  (1  )) : Using l =

!l
=
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1)
1  e  and  =
1  e    e 
1  e  gives
u^l =
 (1  e ) ( + e    1) bL
b (1  e    e  +  ( + e    1))
+ (1  b)

 (1  e )2 + (1  e    e ) (1  )

and v^l =
((1  )e  + e  (1  e )) bL
b (1  e    e  +  ( + e    1))
+ (1  b)

 (1  e )2 + (1  e    e ) (1  )
 .
Then we have Ql =
(1  e ) (1  k)  e  ((1  ) +  (1  e )) (1  (1  b) k)
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e )) :
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Using (26) givesQh =
(1   (1  b)e ) (1  e )  (1  e    e ) (1   (1  b) e )
(1   (1  b)e ) ((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + )) ;
and Ql =
(1  e    e ) e  (1 + (1  b) (1  ))
+e  (e  +    1) (1  (1  b) (1  e    (1  )e ))
(1   (1  b)e )

1  e    e 
+ ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e ))
 :
Remark 2 Ql > Qh; given the value of  :
Proof. We have Ql > Qh if (L  u^l) (1  k)   v^lk   (L  u^h) (1  k) + v^hk = u^h  
u^l + k (v^h   u^h + u^l   v^l) > 0: Using the above solutions for u^h; v^h, u^l and v^l we have
u^h   u^l + k (v^h   u^h + u^l   v^l)
=
(1  ) (1  e    e    (1  (1  b)e ) k) bL
(b (1   + ) + (1  b) (1  e ))
 
b (1  e    e  +  ( + e    1))
+ (1  b)

 (1  e )2 + (1  e    e ) (1  )
 !
where the denominator is positive. Using (26) the numerator is
(1  ) (1  ) (1  b) b2e  (1  e    e )L
1   (1  b)e  > 0; and then Ql > Qh:
We notice that
@Ql
@
=
(1  ) b (1  b)e  (1  e )

(1  e )2    (1  e    e 2)

(1   (1  b)e )
((1  e    e  +  (( + e    1) (b (1  e ) + e ))))2
< 0, and
@Qh
@
=
(1  ) b (1  b)e  (1  e    e )
(1   (1  b)e ) ((1  b) (1  e ) + b (1   + ))2 > 0:
(iii) Consider a CM equilibrium where
1  e    e 
1  e  <  < 1: A rm matches with
probability ; and a worker matches with probability one. During a production period
there are vacancies but no unemployed workers. Then u^ = 0: Then v = v^ + b (L  u^) =
v^ + bL: In a steady state v = bL; then  (v^ + bL) = bL gives v^ = bL

1

  1

:
The net production per worker is QCM1 =
1
L
(L (1  k)  v^k) = 1   (1  b) k   bk

:
Because  >
1  e    e 
1  e  ; then QCM1 > 1   (1  b) k  
bk (1  e )
1  e    e  : Using
(26) gives QCM1 >
e  (1 + (1  ) (1  b))
1   (1  b)e  : Using the solution for Ql above we have
e  (1 + (1  ) (1  b))
1   (1  b)e   Ql =
 (1  ) b (1  b)e  (1  e ) ( + e    1)
(1   (1  b)e )

1  e    e 
+ ( + e    1) (e  + b (1  e ))

> 0: Then QCM1 > Ql > Qh:
(iv) Consider a CM equilibrium where 1 <  < 1+: A rm matches with probability
one, and a worker matches with probability 1=. Then v^ = 0: Also, u = u^+ b (L  u^) : In
a steady state v = b (L  u^) , u= = b (L  u^) , (u^+ b (L  u^)) = = b (L  u^) which
gives u^ =
b (   1)L
1 + b (   1) : Then QCM2 =
(L  u^) (1  k)
L
=
1  k
1 + b (   1) : Using (26) gives
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QCM2 =
1   (1  b)e    (1  e    e )
(1 + b (   1)) (1   (1  b)e ) .
Let us rst compare QCM2 and Qh: We have QCM2 > (<)Qh if  < (>) h
=
 (1   + ) (1   (1  b)) + (1 + ) (1   (1  b) e )  b
1  b+ (1   (1  b))    (1  b) (1 + (1  )) e  ; where
h 2 (1; 1 + )
because the numerator is larger than (1   + ) (1 + (1   (1  b))) > 0 , the denomi-
nator is larger than  (1  (1  b) ( + (1  ) e )) > 0; and numerator minus denomina-
tor is equal to  (1   +  +  (1  b) ( (1  e )  )) >  (1   + ) (1   (1  b))
> 0: Also, 1 +    h =  (1  ) (1  b) (1  e
    e )
1  b+ (1   (1  b))    (1  b) (1 + (1  )) e  > 0:We
have
@h
@
=
(1  ) (1  b) (1 + (1   (1  b))) (e  + e    1)
(1  b+ (1   (1  b))    (1  b) (1 + (1  )) e )2 < 0:
Compare then QCM2 and Ql: We have QCM2 > (<)Ql if  < (>) l
= 1+
 (1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (1   (1  b) (1  e )))
(1 + (1  ) (1  b)) (1  e    e )
+ ( + e    1) (1  (1  b) (1  e    (1  )e ))
where l 2 (1; 1 + ):
Clearly, l > 1:Also, l < 1+ if
1  e    e  +  ( + e    1) (1   (1  b) (1  e ))
(1 + (1  ) (1  b)) (1  e    e )
+ ( + e    1) (1  (1  b) (1  e    (1  )e ))
<
1 which holds because numerator minus denominator is equal to
(1  ) (1  b) (e  + e    1) ( (1  ) +  (1  e )) < 0:We have
@l
@
=
(1  ) (b  1) (1  e ) (1 + (1   (1  b)))
(1     (2  2) e  + (1 + ) e 2)
(1 + (1  ) (1  b)) (1  e    e )
+ ( + e    1) (1  (1  b) (1  e    (1  )e ))
2 > 0
Then, if 1 <  < 1 + , there exists h 2 (1; 1 + ) such that QCM2
 
h

= Qh:
Then QCM2 > Qh if  < h; and QCM2 < Qh if  > h: Also,
@h
@
< 0: There exists also
l 2 (1; 1 + ) such that QCM2
 
l

= Ql: Then QCM2 > Ql if  < l; and QCM2 < Ql if
 > l: Also,
@l
@
> 0: Collect the results in
Remark 3 We have l < h: If  < l , then Qh < Ql < QCM2: If l <  < h; then
Qh < QCM2 < Ql: If  > h , then QCM2 < Qh < Ql:
Proof. We showed that Qh < Ql. If  < l , then Qh < Ql < QCM2, and if  > l
, then QCM2 < Ql: If  < h; then Qh < QCM2 , and if  > h; then QCM2 < Qh < Ql:
Suppose h < l: Then, if h <  < l , we have QCM2 < Qh < Ql and Qh < Ql < QCM2
which cannot hold. Therefore l < h; and the rest of the result follows.
Using the results above we have
Proposition 18 If
1  e    e 
1  e  <  < 1, then QCM > Ql > Qh for given  and : If
1 <  < 1+ ; then (i) Qh < Ql < QCM2 if  < l, (ii) Qh < QCM2 < Ql if l <  < h ,
and (iii) QCM2 < Qh < Ql if  > h; where 1 < l < h < 1 + :
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That is, a centralized market equilibrium is more e¢ cient than a mixed market equi-
librium if  < 1: If 1 <  < 1 + ; a centralized market equilibrium is more e¢ cient
than the mixed market equilibria if  is small enough. If  is large enough, a centralized
market equilibrium is less e¢ cient than either of the mixed market equilibria.
6 A Static Model with a Fixed Number of Firms and
Price Posting in Both Markets
Consider a static model where u and v are xed. This is equivalent to setting  = 0
and b = 1; and setting  as a parameter. We set k = 0 as capital cost is not needed to
regulate the number of rms. The model is the same as Kultti (2011) except that the
number of unemployed (corresponding to buyers in Kulttis article) is deterministic, not
stochastic. We show that mixed market equilibria exist.
6.1 Mixed Market Equilibrium
We solve the ( ; !) relation in a mixed market equilibrium. As before, we study three
cases which di¤er in the u=v ratio in CM.
(i) There are more workers than rms in CM submarket, and then rms there match
with probability one, and workers match with probability p =
1  
(1  !1)  < 1: The
value functions for unmatched agents are Uc = pwc1, Us = e 1, Vc = 1   wc1, and
Vs = 1  e 1   1e 1 ; where 1 = !1

: Then Vc = Vs if wc1 = (1 + 1) e 1 ; and then
Uc = Us if p =
1
1 + 1
: Using p =
1  
(1  !1)  and 1 =
!1

equation p =
1
1 + 1
gives
!1 =


( +    1) < ; and d!1
d
> 0: If   1; then !1 > 0 if  > 0: If  < 1; then
!1 > 0 if  > 1   : There is a continuum of mixed market equilibria where ( ; !1) =
 ;


( +    1)

, where !1 < : We have
@!1
@
> 0, and
@!1
@
=
1
2
 (1  ) > 0:
We have 1 =  +    1:Then wc1 = (1 + 1) e 1 = ( + ) e (+ 1); and @wc1
@
=
@wc1
@
=  1e 1 < 0: That is, if rms choose  and wc1 such that wc1 = ( + ) e (+ 1)
where  > 1   ; then !1 = 

( +    1) gives Uc = Us and Vc = Vs: We have wc1
= (1 + 1) e
 1 > e 1 > e  because !1 < :
Proposition 19 There is a continuum of mixed market equilibria where
wc1 = ( + ) e
 (+ 1) > e , !1 =


( +    1) < ; and d!1
d
> 0:
(ii) There are more rms than workers in CM submarket, and then workers there
match with probability one, and rms match with probability q =
(1  !2) 
1   < 1:
The value functions for unmatched agents are Uc = wc2, Us = e 2, Vc = q (1  wc2),
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and Vs = 1   e 2   2e 2 : Then Uc = Us and Vc = Vs if wc2 = e 2 = 1  
1
q
(1  e 2   2e 2), which gives q = 1  e
 2   2e 2
1  e 2 . This, together with q =
(1  !2) 
1   and  =
2
!2
gives !2 =
2 (1  e 2)
1  e 2   2e 2 +  (2 + e 2   1) > : Because
@q
@!2
=
e 2 (2 + e 2   1)
 (1  e 2)2 > 0; there exists a unique !2 for given (; ) : Equation
1  e 2   2e 2
1  e 2 =
(1  !2) 
1   gives
d!2
d
> 0:
Using !2 >  we have wc2 < e : Also, wc2 = e 2 and 2 =
!2

give !2 =
  lnwc2

:
The solutions for !2 give  =
(1  ) (1  e 2) + e 2 lnwc
1  e 2 + lnwc . Using wc2 = e
 2 gives
 =
(   1) (1  wc2)  wc2 lnwc2
wc2   lnwc2   1 :
Proposition 20 There is a continuum of mixed market equilibria where wc < e , 
=
(   1) (1  wc2)  wc2 lnwc2
wc2   lnwc2   1 , !2 =
  lnwc

> ; and
d!2
d
> 0:
(iii) There are equally many rms and workers in CM
The value functions for unmatched agents are Uc = wc3, Us = e 3, Vc = 1   wc3,
and Vs = 1   e 3   3e 3 : Then Vc = Vs gives wc3 = (1 + 3) e 3 ; and Uc = Us gives
wc3 = e
 3 : Then Vc = Vs and Uc = Us only if (1 + 3) e 3 = e 3. This holds only if
3 = 0 which holds only if !3 = 0 or  = 0: This means that a mixed market equilibrium
does not exist.
Kultti (2011) analyzes an otherwise similar setting, except that the number of moving
agents (buyers in Kulttis article) is stochastic, and the stayers (sellers in Kulttis article)
choose locations and prices before the number of buyers is realized. He nds that a mixed
market equilibrium does not exist. In p. 17 he writes: "One can understand the result
[non-existence of a mixed market equilibrium] even without stochastic demand. Assume
that there is a xed number of buyers and sellers. Assume further that half of them are
in each market. In the non-clustered market there may be local under- or overdemand,
and consequently the number of trades is smaller than in the clustered market where
all the possible trades are realised. If the buyers in both markets are to do equally well
they must get a larger share of realised trades in the non-clustered market than in the
clustered market. But then the sellers in the non-clustered market necessarily fare worse
than in the clustered market. Now, if the sellers are allowed to reallocate themselves
some of them go to the clustered market."
Kulttis claim is premature. He only says that it is not true that in equilibrium one
half of the buyers and one half of the sellers are in each market, and he concludes that
the two markets do not coexist. I showed that there are two continua of mixed market
equilibria. In one continuum, there are more workers than rms in the centralized market,
and then ! < : In the other one, the centralized market has more rms than workers, and
! > : If there are equally many workers and rms in CM, a mixed market equilibrium
does not exist.
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6.2 CM Equilibrium
We check the existence of a centralized market equilibrium against a coalitional deviation
to a decentralized market. The value functions for deviating agents are Uds = e
  and
V ds = 1 e  e ; where  = u=v = =; where u and v are the sizes of deviating
groups of workers and rms, respectively.
(i) Assume  > 1: Then in CM a rm matches with probability one, and a worker
matches with probability 1= < 1. The value functions for unmatched agents in CM are
Uc = wc= and Vc = 1   wc where wc  1: Then Uds > Uc if e  > wc, and V ds > Vc if
(1 + ) e  < wc. A coalitional deviation to SM is protable if (1 + ) e  < wc < e :
If rms set wc < (1 + ) e , there is no protable deviation. But because a rm hires
a worker with probability one anyhow, conditional that no deviation takes place, the
equilibrium wage is wc = 0:
(ii) Assume  < 1:
In CM a worker matches with probability one, and a rm matches with probability
. The value functions for unmatched agents in CM are Uc = wc, and Vc =  (1  wc) ;
where wc  1: Then Uds > Uc if e  > wc , and V ds > Vc if wc > 1 
1

(1  e    e ) :
There is a protable deviation to SM if 1   1

(1  e    e ) < wc < e : As 1  
1

(1  e    e ) and e  decrease in ; and 1   1

(1  e    e ) < (>) e  if 
> (<) ~ where ~ satises
1  e ~   ~e ~
1  e ~ = ; a protable deviation exists whenever
wc < e
 ~: Suppose all rms choose a uniform wage wc 2
 
e 

; 1

: If rm i chooses
wci = wc+"i where "i > 0; it hires a worker with probability one. It is indi¤erent between
wc and wci if "i = (1  ) (1  wc) : Then rm i benets if "i 2 (0; (1  ) (1  wc)) : By
this logic, a rm gains if it chooses a wage a bit larger than the rest of the rms. As all
rms do this, wages increase until all rms pay wc = 1:
(iii) Assume  = 1:
In CM rms and workers match with probability one. Then Uc = wc and Vc = 1 wc
where wc  1: Then Uds > Uc if e  > wc; and V ds > Vc if 1   e    e  > 1   wc:
There is a protable deviation to SM if (1 + ) e  < wc < e  which cannot hold. Any
wc 2 [0; 1] is compatible with equilibrium.
We gather the above results in
Proposition 21 A CM equilibrium exists. If  > 1, the equilibrium wage is wc = 0: If
 < 1, the equilibrium wage is wc = 1: If  = 1, the equilibrium wage is wc 2 [0; 1] :
6.3 SM Equilibrium
The value functions for unmatched agents are Us = e , and Vs = 1 e  e : Consider
a coalition of u workers and v rms which can deviate to CM. Suppose u > v; then
  = > 1: In CM a worker matches with probability 1= < 1, and a rm matches
with probability one. The value functions for unmatched agents are Udc = wc=; and
V dc = 1   wc: Then Udc > Us if wc > e ; and V dc > Vs if wc < (1 + ) e . A
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protable deviation exists if e  < wc < (1 + ) e : Condition e  < (1 + ) e  holds
if


< 1 +
1

: Together with  > 1; a protable deviation exists if
1

<


< 1 +
1

: Then
there exist wc 2
 
e ; (1 + ) e 

. That is, there is a protable deviation for all  > 0;
and a decentralized market equilibrium does not exist.
7 Conclusion
I have shown that a labor market with homogenous rms and workers can be purely
centralized, or purely decentralized, and that both markets can coexist. The outcome
depends on the way wages are determined, and on the relative magnitude of capital cost
and rmsbargaining power. If wages are determined by bargaining in both markets, a
decentralized market equilibrium does not exist. Both markets coexist only for a specic
combination of capital cost and rmsbargaining power. If the latter is relatively large,
a centralized market equilibrium exists. If wages are posted in the search market but
there is bargaining in the centralized market, a relatively equal sharing of match surplus
in the centralized market leads to a centralized market equilibrium. If the match surplus
is shared relatively unequally, a decentralized market equilibrium exists. For specic
combinations of bargaining parameter and capital cost both markets coexist.
I considered also a model where wages are posted in both markets. Then a decen-
tralized market equilibrium does not exist. A centralized market equilibrium exists if the
unemployment-vacancy ratio in the matching stage is not very small or very large. There
are two continua of mixed market equilibria. Finally I showed that a static model with
a xed unemployment-vacancy ratio produces a centralized market equilibrium and two
continua of mixed market equilibria, but no decentralized market equilibrium exists.
The real world labor markets share features of centralized and decentralized markets.
Therefore it would be interesting to build a model where a centralized market and a
search market coexist for a large range of parameter values. In the present model agents
can visit only one market in a period, and therefore the two markets coexist only if both
rms and workers are indi¤erent between the markets. If there is wage bargaining in the
centralized market, the indi¤erence holds only for a specic relation between capital cost
and rmsbargaining power. The need for indi¤erence is removed if for example workers
can visit both markets in the same period. This is left for future work.
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